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We study the impact of the finite-size effect on the continuous-variable measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) protocol, mainly considering the finite-size
effect on the parameter estimation procedure. The central-limit theorem and maximum likelihood
estimation theorem are used to estimate the parameters. We also analyze the relationship between
the number of exchanged signals and the optimal modulation variance in the protocol. It is proved
that when Charlie’s position is close to Bob, the CV-MDI QKD protocol has the farthest transmis-
sion distance in the finite-size scenario. Finally, we discuss the impact of finite-size effects related to
the practical detection in the CV-MDI QKD protocol. The overall results indicate that the finite-
size effect has a great influence on the secret key rate of the CV-MDI QKD protocol and should not
be ignored.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4] is the most ma-
ture technology in quantum cryptography, which allows
two distant legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to gener-
ate secret keys through an untrusted channel controlled
by an eavesdropper, Eve. The coherent state continuous-
variable QKD protocol (CV-QKD) [5, 6], based on con-
tinuous modulation (Gaussian modulation), was pro-
posed in 2002 [7]. To effectively improve protocol secu-
rity transmission distance, a continuous-variable two-way
quantum key distribution protocol was proposed [8, 9].
After that, the CV-QKD protocol has received increasing
attention in the past few years due to its high secret key
rate and low-cost advantage [10–15]. In the experiment,
Jouguet et al.[16] achieved the CV-QKD experiment of
all-fiber Gaussian modulation coherent state and homo-
dyne detection of 80 km in the laboratory. The field tests
of a CV-QKD system [17] have extended the distribution
distance to 50 km over commercial fiber, where the se-
cure key rates are two orders of magnitude higher than
previous field test demonstrations.
Although the QKD protocols, including CV proto-
cols [14, 15, 18], are guaranteed to have unconditional
security in theory based on quantum physics, the ac-
tual security is related to the performance of the de-
vice. Due to the imperfection of the detector in the
practical CV-QKD system, Eve can implement quan-
tum hacking attacks for CV detectors, such as the
local oscillator calibration attack [19, 20], the wave-
length attack [21, 22], the detector saturation attack
[23]. These attacks use the detector’s imperfect char-
acteristics to operate the detector results to reduce the
∗ zhangyc@bupt.edu.cn
† yusong@bupt.edu.cn
additional noise variance, so that Alice and Bob esti-
mate the secret key rate too high, resulting in security
risks. For this reason, continuous-variable measurement-
device-independent (CV-MDI) protocol has been pro-
posed [24, 25]. Since the measurement part of the proto-
col is completely committed by an untrusted third party,
the security of the protocol does not depend on the se-
curity of the detector. Therefore, this protocol can nat-
urally resist all hacker attacks against detectors.
In most conventional security proofs, the theoretical
security analysis relies on the assumption that the two
communication parties exchange the infinite number of
signals in the asymptotic scheme [4]. Hence, the finite-
size effect is the key problem that CV protocol needs
to be solved in the practical implementation. In recent
years, the attention of researchers has gradually shifted to
the practical security of CV-QKD protocol. Scarani and
Renner [26] proposed a security bound based on smooth
min-entropy in 2008. In 2010, Leverrier et al. [27] ex-
tended the finite-size analysis framework from discrete-
variable (DV) protocol to CV protocol, taking into ac-
count the finite-size effect of the parameter estimation
process. In 2012, Jouguet et al. [28] researched the finite-
size effect of CV-QKD protocol on the secret key rate in
the case of practical detections. So far, the security of
the CV-MDI QKD protocol in the asymptotic scenario
has been demonstrated [24, 25, 29–31]. But the feasibil-
ity of CV-MDI QKD protocol under finite-size effect has
not yet been confirmed.
To solve this problem, we study the influence of the
finite-size effect on the CV-MDI QKD protocol under
collective attack. Here we only consider the reverse rec-
onciliation protocol and for the direct reconciliation pro-
tocol we can use the similar calculation method. The
numerical simulations of the protocol are given at block
lengths between 106 and 1010. When Charlie is placed
in Bob (asymmetric case) and considering the optimal
2FIG. 1. A schematic diagram of CV-MDI QKD. BS stands for
50 : 50 beam splitter, Hom stands for homodyne detection.
modulation variance conditions, the farthest transmis-
sion distance can reach 86km for reconciliation efficiency
β = 1 and 75 km for β = 96.9%. Finally, we discuss the
impact of the practical detection on the CV-MDI QKD
protocol under the finite-size effect.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec.
II, we first introduce the main idea of the CV-MDI QKD
protocol, and then study the finite-size analysis of the
parameter estimation process of CV-MDI QKD protocol
in detail, and introduce the method and formulas that
are used in finite-size analysis. In Sec. III, we show the
simulation results of the secret key rate, and give the op-
timal modulation variance and the maximal transmission
distance under different conditions. Our conclusions are
drawn in Sec. IV.
II. CV-MDI QKD PROTOCOL AND
PARAMETER ESTIMATION
The setup of the CV-MDI QKD protocol is illustrated
in Fig. 1. The Gaussian modulation coherent state
CV-MDI QKD protocol is mainly described as follows:
First, Alice and Bob use lasers to generate light sources,
and prepare Gaussian coherent states independently by
using the phase modulator and amplitude modulator,
respectively. Then, Alice and Bob send the prepared
quantum states to an untrusted third party (Charlie)
for continuous-variable Bell measurement. The specific
operation is that Charlie receives two quantum states
through a 50 : 50 beam splitter, and then uses two homo-
dyne detectors to measure the interference results. Next,
Charlie publishes his measurement results. Finally, Alice
and Bob use the corrected data for parameter estimation,
data postprocessing, data reconciliation, and private key
amplification to get the final security secret key.
The above is the protocol process of the CV-MDI QKD
protocol in the prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme. The
PM scheme is easy to implement, but it often uses the
entanglement-based (EB) scheme in security analysis.
The equivalence between the EB scheme of the CV-MDI
QKD protocol and the PM scheme has been proven in
Ref. [24], and the EB scheme of the CV-MDI QKD pro-
tocol is shown in Fig. 2. The equivalence is reflected
in two points: On the one hand, the equivalence of the
FIG. 2. Entanglement-based scheme of CV-MDI QKD with
practical detector. T1(T2) is the channel transmittance for
Alice-Charlie (Bob-Charlie), ε1(ε2) is the channel excess noise
for Alice-Charlie (Bob-Charlie). η is the efficiency of the de-
tection, v is the variance of the thermal state, vel is the vari-
ance of electronic noise. EPR is the two-mode squeezed state,
P-Hom is practical homodyne detection, Hom is ideal homo-
dyne detection, Het is heterodyne detection.
state preparation; that is, the heterodyne detection of
one mode of the two-mode squeezed (EPR) state is equiv-
alent to the preparation of a Gaussian modulation coher-
ent state. On the other hand, the data correction process
in the PM scheme is equivalent to the displacement oper-
ation in the EB scheme. Therefore, only the EB version
of the CV-MDI QKD protocol is analyzed in the follow-
ing security analysis.
To calculate the secret key rate of the CV-MDI QKD
protocol, the researchers proposed two calculation meth-
ods [24, 25]: One is the secret key rate formula based on
entanglement swapping. That is, assuming that Bob’s
EPR state preparation and displacement operations are
regarded as manipulated by Eve in Fig. 2, then the CV-
MDI QKD protocol can be equivalent to a one-way CV-
QKD protocol. The other is the secret key rate formula
based on the sub-scenario. That is, each subscenario is
the same as a one-way CV-QKD protocol, and the fi-
nal secret key rate is the mean of the key rate of each
sub-scenario. CV-MDI QKD protocol in the asymptotic
regime and collective attack conditions, the secret key
3rate of the former is smaller than the latter’s secret key
rate. Moreover, in the case of finite-size, the two secu-
rity analysis methods are equivalent to the coherent state
CV-QKD one-way protocol using heterodyne detection.
In the following, because the idea of security analysis is
more concise and the calculation of the secret key rate is
simpler, we adopt the former secret key rate calculation
method.
According to the finite-size effect analysis of discrete-
variable QKD protocol against collective attacks, the ex-
pression of the secret key rate of the one-way CV-QKD
protocol against collective attack in the finite-size case is
[27]:
k =
n
N
[βI(a : b)− Sǫ
PE
(b : E)−∆(n)], (1)
whereN is the total number of signals exchanged by Alice
and Bob, of which only n signals are used to generate the
keys. β ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency, and I(a : b)
is the mutual information of Alice and Bob. Considering
the influence of the finite-size effect on the accuracy of
the parameter estimation; that is, under certain failure
probability ǫPE , the true channel parameters are within
a certain confidence interval near the estimated param-
eters, then the conditional entropy of Eve and Bob is
expressed as SǫPE (b : E). The most important parame-
ter in the expression, ∆(n), is related to the security of
the private key amplification [27]. Its value is given by:
∆(n) = (2dimHX +3)
√
log2(2/ǫ˜)
n
+
2
n
log2(1/ǫPA). (2)
In Eq. (1), ∆(n) is the correction term in the formula
for security secret key rate, which varies with the total
length of the exchanged signals. The first term of Eq. (2)
is the convergence speed of the smooth minimum entropy
of an independent and identically distributed state to the
von Neumann entropy, which is the main part to deter-
mine ∆(n). Where HX corresponds to the dimension of
the emphHilbert space of the variable x in the raw key,
taking dimHX = 2 [27] in the CV protocol. ǫ¯ and ǫPA
are the smoothing parameter and the failure probability
of private key amplification processes, respectively, and
we take their optimal value as ǫ¯ = ǫPA = 10
−10 [27].
In the following, we study the impact of the finite-
size effect on the parameter estimation process of the
CV-MDI QKD protocol. More precisely, we analyze the
influence of finite signals length N on the estimation of
channel excess noise ε1, ε2. Due to the limited signals
length, the statistical fluctuation of the sampling estima-
tion in the parameter estimation process will be worse,
which makes the evaluation accuracy of both communi-
cation sides on Eve’s eavesdropping behavior worse. To
ensure the security of the protocol, it is necessary to do
the worst estimate of the impact of eavesdropping. That
is, one need to compute the maximum value of the Holevo
information between Eve and Bob in the case of statis-
tical fluctuation in the parameter estimation, the maxi-
mum value of SǫPE (b : E).
The calculation of SǫPE (b : E) depends on the covari-
ance matrix γA1B′1 of shared state ρA1B′1 of Alice and
Bob in the EB version of the protocol. In particular, in
the CV-MDI QKD protocol, we need to consider the sta-
tistical fluctuation of the channel transmittance (T1 ,T2)
and the excess noise of the Alice-Charlie channel and
the Bob-Charlie channel (ε1, ε2), the Alice modulation
variance (VA), and the Bob modulation variance (VB),
respectively.
In the EB version of the CV-MDI QKD protocol, as
shown in Fig. 1, before Charlie makes a homodyne detec-
tion to the C and D modes respectively, γA1CDB1 takes
the following form:
γA1CDB1 =


V1I2
√
1
2T1 (V
2
1 −1)σz
√
1
2T1 (V
2
1 −1)σz 0I2√
1
2T1 (V
2
1 −1)σz
(
1
2T1 (V1 + χ1)+
1
2T2 (V1+χ2)
)
I2
(
1
2T1 (V1+χ1)− 12T2 (V1+χ2)
)
I2
√
1
2T2 (V
2
2 − 1)σz√
1
2T1 (V
2
1 −1)σz
(
1
2T1 (V1+χ1)− 12T2 (V1+χ2)
)
I2
(
1
2T1 (V1+χ1)+
1
2T2 (V1+χ2)
)
I2 −
√
1
2T2 (V
2
2 − 1)σz
0I2
√
1
2T2 (V
2
2 −1)σz −
√
1
2T2 (V
2
2 −1)σz V2I2


,
(3)
where I2 is the 2× 2 identity matrix and σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
,
so γA1CDB1 is obviously an 8× 8 covariance matrix. The
parameters of the above matrix are given by V1 = VA +
1, V2 = VB + 1, VA and VB are the modulation variance
of Alice and Bob in the PM protocol. T1 and T2 are
the transmittance of the Alice-Charlie channel and the
Bob-Charlie channel. ε1 and ε2 in χ1 =
1
T1
− 1 + ε1,
χ2 =
1
T2
−1+ε2 are the excess noise of the corresponding
channel. According to the covariance matrix Eq. (3), we
know that the modulation variance of Alice and Bob,〈
x21
〉
and
〈
x22
〉
, the variance of Charlie,
〈
y21
〉
,
〈
y22
〉
and
〈y1y2〉, the covariance of Alice and Charlie 〈x1y1〉, and
the covariance of Bob and Charlie 〈x2y2〉. These values
and secret key rate parameters are related through:〈
x21
〉
= V1 − 1 = VA,
〈
x22
〉
= V2 − 1 = VB , (4)
〈
y21
〉
=
〈
y22
〉
=
1
2
(T1VA+T2VB)+1+
1
2
(T1ε1+T2ε2), (5)
4〈x1y1〉 =
√
T1
2
(V1 − 1) =
√
T1
2
VA,
〈x2y2〉 =
√
T2
2
(V2 − 1) =
√
T2
2
VB, (6)
〈y1y2〉 = 1
2
(T1VA − T2VB) + 1
2
(T1ε1 − T2ε2). (7)
In practical CV-MDI QKD systems, the quantities es-
timated by Alice and Bob are obtained by the sampling
of m = N −n pairs of correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1...m.
Since the Alice-Charlie channel and the Bob-Charlie
channel are linear channels, the variables of Alice, Bob
and Charlie follow a Gaussian distribution. Within this
model, we consider that the data before the beam splitter
is represented as y′1, y
′
2. So before the beam splitter, Al-
ice and Charlie’s and Bob and Charlie’s data are linked
through the following relation:
y′1 = t
′
1x1 + z1,
y′2 = t
′
2x2 + z2, (8)
where t′1 =
√
T1, t
′
2 =
√
T2, z1, z2 follow a centered
normal distribution with unknown variance σ′1
2
= 1 +
T1ε1, σ
′
2
2
= 1+T2ε2. According to the known parameter
relations in the covariance matrix, it can be expressed
that the variance of the unknown parameters before the
beam splitter:
〈y′12〉=
〈
y1
2
〉
+ 〈y1y2〉
= T1VA + 1 + T1ε1 = t
′
1
2
VA + σ
′
1
2
, (9)
〈y′22〉=
〈
y2
2
〉− 〈y1y2〉
= T2VB + 1 + T2ε2 = t
′
2
2
VB + σ
′
2
2
. (10)
Maximum-likelihood estimators tˆ′1, tˆ
′
2, σˆ
′
1
2
, σˆ′2
2
, VˆA, VˆB
are known for the normal linear model [27]:
tˆ′1 =
∑m
i=1 x1iy
′
1i∑m
i=1 x1i
2
,
tˆ′2 =
∑m
i=1 x2iy
′
2i∑m
i=1 x2i
2
, (11)
σˆ′1
2
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
y′1i − tˆ′1x1i
)2
,
σˆ′2
2
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
y′2i − tˆ′2x2i
)2
, (12)
VˆA =
1
m
m∑
i=1
x2i
2,
VˆB =
1
m
m∑
i=1
x1i
2. (13)
The estimators tˆ′1, tˆ
′
2, σˆ
′
1
2
, σˆ′2
2
, VˆA, VˆB are independent es-
timators with the following distributions:
tˆ′1 ∼ N
(
t
′
1,
σ′1
2∑m
i=1 x
2
1i
)
, tˆ′2 ∼ N
(
t
′
2,
σ′2
2∑m
i=1 x
2
2i
)
(14)
mσˆ′1
2
σ′1
2 ,
mσˆ′2
2
σ′2
2 ,
mVˆA
VA
,
mVˆB
VB
∼ χ2(m− 1), (15)
where t′1, t
′
2, σ
′
1
2
, σ′2
2
, VA, VB are the true values of the
parameters. Due to the limit of length m, we can esti-
mate the confidence interval for these parameters when
the confidence probability is ǫPE/2:
t
′
1 ∈ [tˆ′1 −∆t′1, tˆ′1 +∆t′1],
t
′
2 ∈ [tˆ′2 −∆t′2, tˆ′2 +∆t′2], (16)
σ′1
2 ∈ [σˆ′1
2 −∆σ′12, σˆ′1
2
+∆σ′1
2
],
σ′2
2 ∈ [σˆ′2
2 −∆σ′22, σˆ′2
2
+∆σ′2
2
], (17)
VA ∈ [VˆA −∆VA, VˆA +∆VA],
VB ∈ [VˆB −∆VB, VˆB +∆VB ], (18)
where ∆t′1 = zǫPE/2
√
σˆ′
1
2
mVA
, ∆t′2 = zǫPE/2
√
σˆ′
2
2
mVA
,
∆σ′1
2
= zǫPE/2
σˆ′
1
2√
2√
m
, ∆VA = zǫPE/2
VˆA
√
2√
m
,
∆σ′2
2 = zǫPE/2
σˆ′
2
2√
2√
m
,∆VB = zεPE/2
VˆB
√
2√
m
, and zǫPE/2
satisfies 1 − erf(zǫPE/2/
√
2)/2 = ǫPE/2. ǫPE is the
failure probability of the parameter estimation process,
which generally takes 10−10. erf(x) is error function, de-
fined as
erf(x) =
2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (19)
We can estimate T1 = tˆ′1
2
, T2 = tˆ′2
2
and ε1 =
σˆ′
1
2−1
tˆ′
1
2 , ε2 =
σˆ′
2
2−1
tˆ′
2
2 by previous estimators and confidence intervals.
Next, Charlie uses two homodyne detectors to measure
the C and D modes, and Bob performs displacement op-
erations based on Charlie’s measurements. Indeed, the
CV-MDI QKD protocol is equivalent to a one-way CV-
QKD protocol when Bob’s EPR state preparations and
displacement operations are also untrusted. Then the co-
variance matrix γA1B′1
of the state ρA1B′1
shared by Alice
and Bob is
γA1B′1
=
(
V1I2
√
T (V 21 −1)σz√
T (V 21 −1)σz [T (V1−1)+1+Tε′]I2
)
(20)
where
T =
T1
2
g2,
5ε′ =1 +
1
T1
[2 + T2 (ε2 − 2) + T1 (ε2 − 1)]
+
1
T1
(√
2
g
√
VB −
√
T2
√
VB + 2
)2
.
Here one selects g =
√
2
T2
√
VB
VB+2
[24] so that the equiv-
alent excess noise ε′ is minimal. So there is:
ε′ = ε1 +
1
T1
[T2 (ε2 − 2) + 2] . (21)
Accordingly, the mutual information between Alice and
Bob has the following form:
IAB = log2
[
T (V + χ) + 1
T (1 + χ) + 1
]
, (22)
where χ = 1T − 1 + ε′.
In the equivalent one-way protocol model, the analysis
method of the finite-size effect on the parameter esti-
mation is consistent with the CV-QKD protocol. Within
this model, Alice and Bob’s data respectively satisfies the
Gaussian distribution and their data are linked through
the following relation:
y = tx+ z, (23)
where t =
√
T and z follows a centered normal distribu-
tion with unknown variance σ2 = 1+ T ǫ′. For any value
of the modulation variance VA, S(b : E) and the variables
t, σ2 are related as follows:
∂S (b : E)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
σ2
< 0,
∂S (b : E)
∂σ2
∣∣∣∣
t
> 0. (24)
This means that, under 1 − ǫPE probability there is a
covariance matrix that minimizes the secret key rate:
γA1B′1
=
(
(VA + 1) I2 tminZσz
tminZσz
(
t2minVA + σ
2
max
)
I2
)
, (25)
where VA is the modulation variance of Alice.
And for Gaussian modulation, the parameter Z =(
VA
2 + 2VA
)1/2
. To analyze the impact of the statistical
fluctuation of each parameter on the covariance matrix,
the parameters to be estimated are substituted into the
above matrix. The covariance matrix is changed into:
γA1B′1
=

 (VA + 1) I2 t
′
1
t′
2
√
VB
VB+2
Zσz
t′
1
t′
2
√
VB
VB+2
Zσz
[
t′
1
2
t′
2
2
VB
VB+2
VA + 1 +
VB
VB+2
(
σ′
1
2+σ′
2
2−2t′
2
2
t
′2
2
)]
I2

 . (26)
When the estimated parameters are determined, we can
calculate the maximum value of SǫPE (b : E).In conse-
quence, the secret key rate of CV-MDI QKD protocol
against collective attack with finite-size effect can be cal-
culated according to the Eqs. (1) and (2).
III. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we give and discuss the numerical sim-
ulation results of the CV-MDI QKD protocol in ideal
detection case with the finite-size effect. See the ap-
pendix for the impact of the practical detection on the
CV-MDI QKD protocol. To consider the characteristics
of CV-MDI QKD protocol, we first perform numerical
simulations of the secret key rate in the ideal reconcilia-
tion efficiency. In the following figures, the dark red solid
lines, dark blue dot-dashed lines, dark black dotted lines,
light yellow solid lines, light pink dot-dashed lines, and
light green dotted lines correspond to the block lengths
of 106, 107, 108, 109, 1010, and asymptotic curves, respec-
tively. Figure 3 shows the relationship between trans-
mission distance from Alice to Charlie (LAC) and from
Bob to Charlie (LBC) of the CV-MDI QKD protocol un-
der finite-size effect. It can be seen that, under different
block lengths, when Bob is placed in the untrusted third
party (LBC = 0), the asymmetric structure, LAC has the
farthest transmission distance, more than 85 km. When
LBC increases, LAC decreases rapidly and the sum of the
two is also reduced. For N = 1010 (light green dashed
line), even if LAC is reduced to 0, the farthest LBC can-
not exceed 7 km.
For the sake of optimizing the performance of the pro-
tocol, we also need to consider the optimal modulation
variance of the protocol under different block lengths.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the modulation
variance and the secret key rate under the ideal recon-
ciliation efficiency of the CV-MDI QKD protocol with
the finite-size effect. We find that with the improve-
ment of the modulation variance, the secret key rate
gradually converges under the ideal reconciliation effi-
ciency (β = 1). The optimal modulation variance of
the CV-MDI QKD protocol with the finite-size effect in
the asymmetric case tends to be infinite. We choose
VA = VB = 10
5 to see the performance of the protocol in
the ideal modulation.
6FIG. 3. (Color online) Comparison between the maximal
transmission distance for the CV-MDI QKD protocol under
the finite-size effect. The CV-MDI QKD protocol with ideal
reconciliation efficiency β=1, where the secret key rate k is
positive. The block lengths from left to right curves corre-
spond to N =106, 107, 108, 109, 1010, and asymptotic regime.
Here we use the ideal modulation variance VA = VB = 10
5,
excess noises ε1=ε2=0.002 [16].
FIG. 4. (Color online) Optimal modulation variance for the
CV-MDI QKD protocol in the asymmetric case with the
finite-size effect. CV-MDI QKD protocol with ideal reconcil-
iation efficiency β = 1. From top to bottom, the block length
N is equal to 106,107,108,109,1010, and asymptotic regime.
Here we use the excess noises ε1 = ε2 = 0.002 [16].
Figure 5 displays the impact of the finite-size effect on
the CV-MDI QKD protocol under the asymmetric case
and ideal modulation variance. As shown in the figure,
when the data length is N = 106 (dark red solid line),
the security transmission distance is about 32 km. When
the data length is N = 1010 (light pink dot-dashed line),
the security transmission distance of the protocol is up
to 86 km, and the longer the data length, the closer the
security transmission distance is to asymptotic regime.
FIG. 5. (Color online) Secret key rate for the CV-MDI QKD
protocol in the asymmetric case with the finite-size effect. The
CV-MDI QKD protocol with ideal reconciliation efficiency
β = 1. The block lengths from left to right curves corre-
spond to N = 106, 107, 108, 109, 1010, and asymptotic regime.
Here we use the ideal modulation variance VA = VB = 10
5,
excess noises ε1 = ε2 = 0.002 [16].
FIG. 6. (Color online) Optimal modulation variance for the
CV-MDI QKD protocol in asymmetric case with the finite-
size effect. The CV-MDI QKD protocol with imperfect rec-
onciliation efficiency β = 96.9%. From top to bottom, the
block length N is equal to 106,107,108,109,1010, and asymp-
totic regime. Here we use the excess noises ε1 = ε2 = 0.002
[16].
Noteworthily, in Eq. (1), the reconciliation efficiency
β can be regarded as the ratio between the actual ex-
tracted mutual information and the ideal extracted mu-
tual information [32]. After data reverse reconciliation,
the length of the key shared between Alice and Bob be-
comes nβI (x : y). Therefore, under the finite-size effect,
imperfect reconciliation efficiency will also affect the se-
curity transmission distance of the CV-MDI QKD proto-
col. Figure 6 shows the optimal modulation variance of
7FIG. 7. (Color online) Comparison among the maximal trans-
mission distance for the CV-MDI QKD protocol under finite-
size effect. The CV-MDI QKD protocol with imperfect rec-
onciliation efficiency β = 96.9%, within which the secret key
rate k is positive. The block lengths from left to right curves
correspond to N = 106, 107, 108, 109, 1010, and asymptotic
regime. Here we use the optimal modulation variance, excess
noises ε1 = ε2 = 0.002 [16].
FIG. 8. (Color online) Secret key rate for CV-MDI QKD
protocol in asymmetric case with finite-size effect. CV-MDI
QKD protocol with imperfect reconciliation efficiency β =
96.9%. The block lengths from left to right curves correspond
to N = 106, 107, 108, 109, 1010 and asymptotic regime. Here
we use the optimal modulation variance, excess noises ε1 =
ε2 = 0.002 [16].
the CV-MDI QKD protocol with imperfect reconciliation
efficiency β= 96.9% [33, 34] in different block lengths.
The numbers at the end of the arrow are the values of
the optimal modulation variance. The simulation results
show that the finite-size effect has an influence on the
optimal modulation variance under the imperfect recon-
ciliation efficiency. With the increase of block length, the
optimal modulation variance is decreasing.
Similarly, in the imperfect reconciliation efficiency, the
asymmetric case of the CV-MDI QKD protocol has the
farthest security transmission distance, as shown in Fig.
7. And the selection of the optimal modulation variance
increases the final security transmission distance. In Fig.
8, we display the relationship between secret key rate and
transmission distance of the CV-MDI QKD protocol in
the asymmetric case with the finite-size effect under im-
perfect reconciliation efficiency and optimal modulation
variance. The simulation results show that the optimal
modulation variance improves the security transmission
distance while increasing the secret key rate. And when
the data length is 106 (dark red solid line), the secu-
rity transmission distance is about 23 km.When the data
length is 1010 (light pink dot-dashed line), the protocol
has a far greater security transmission distance, close to
75 km in the case of imperfect reconciliation efficiency
(β = 96.9%).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we roughly describe the CV-MDI QKD
protocol and propose a finite-size analysis of the CV-MDI
QKD protocol under collective attack. This provides a
bridge for the theoretical and practicality of the CV-MDI
QKD protocol. By using the continuous-variable proto-
col under the finite-size scenario of the secret key rate
formula for numerical simulation, we see that the secret
key rate and the security transmission distance are af-
fected when considering the finite-size effect. The results
demonstrate that the finite-size effect also influences the
optimal modulation variance. With the increase of the
block length, the optimal modulation variance is decreas-
ing. And at various block lengths between 106 and 1010,
when Bob is placed in an untrusted third party; that is,
under the asymmetric case, the CV-MDI QKD protocol
has the farthest security transmission distance. The CV-
MDI QKD protocol of the asymmetric structure with the
finite-size effect can safely transmit about 86 km under
the ideal reconciliation efficiency and optimal modulation
variance conditions at 1010 block size . When the recon-
ciliation efficiency is 96.9%, under the above conditions,
the maximum transmission distance of the protocol is
about 75 km.
It can be seen that, as with the CV-QKD one-way pro-
tocol, in the CV-MDI QKD protocol, the fewer signals
exchanged, the more obvious is the finite-size effect, the
faster the secret key rate and security transmission dis-
tance drop. The overall results show that the practical
implementation of CV-MDI QKD should not neglect the
influence of the finite-size effect.
Note that we mainly focus on the impact of the finite-
size effect on the CV-MDI QKD protocol under arbitrary
collective attack. Recently, the composable security of
CV-MDI QKD protocol against coherent attacks in a
practical finite-size scenario has been proved rigorously
[35, 36].
8Note added. An independent work [37] has been posted
on arXiv. This work also studies the impact of the finite-
size effect of the CV-MDI QKD protocol.
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APPENDIX: DISCUSSION ON PRACTICAL
DETECTION
We now consider the finite-size effect related to the de-
tection setup. Since the third party Charlie uses two ho-
modyne detectors to measure the quantum state for the
Bell measurement in the practical system, the impact
of the practical detectors on the CV-MDI QKD proto-
col should be considered. Although the security of the
CV-MDI QKD protocol is not limited by the detector, its
performance is constrained by the performance of the de-
tector. To research the effect of the practical detection on
the protocol in the case of the finite-size effect, we mainly
consider the ideal coordination efficiency (β=1) situation.
Now, the EB version of the CV-MDI QKD protocol in
a practical detection scheme is shown in Fig. 2. An
imperfect homodyne detection is represented by a beam
splitter and thermal noise, wherein the transmittance of
the beam splitter is the detection efficiency η, the rela-
tionship between the variance of the thermal state v and
detector electronic noise variance vel is v = 1+vel/(1−η).
For the CV-MDI QKD protocol considering the practical
detector, it is also necessary to estimate the covariance
matrix between Alice and Bob. The estimated param-
eters are the variance of Alice, Bob, Charlie, Alice and
Charlie’s covariance, and Bob and Charlie’s covariance:〈
x21
〉
= V1 − 1 = VA,
〈
x22
〉
= V2 − 1 = VB , (27)
〈
y21
〉
=
〈
y22
〉
= η
[
1
2
T1(V1 + χ1) +
1
2
T2(V2 + χ2)
]
+1− η + vel
=
1
2
η(T1VA + T2VB) +
1
2
η(T1ε1 + T2ε2)
+1 + vel, (28)
〈x1y1〉 = √η
√
T1
2
(V1 − 1) =
√
ηT1
2
VA,
〈x2y2〉 = √η
√
T2
2
(V2 − 1) =
√
ηT2
2
VB, (29)
FIG. 9. (Color online) Secret key rate for CV-MDI QKD
protocol in asymmetric case with finite-size effect. CV-MDI
QKD protocol with perfect reconciliation efficiency β = 1 and
imperfect homodyne detectors η = 96%, υel = 0.015. The
block lengths from left to right curves correspond to N =
106, 107, 108, 109, 1010 and asymptotic regime. Here we use
the ideal modulation variance VA = VB = 10
5, excess noises
ε1 = ε2 = 0.002 [16].
〈y1y2〉 =η
[
1
2
T1(V1 + χ1)− 1
2
T2(V2 + χ2)
]
=
1
2
η(T1VA − T2VB) + 1
2
η(T1ε1 − T2ε2). (30)
The parameter estimations below are calculated in the
same way as the calculation without considering the de-
tections, but the statistical fluctuations of η and vel are
taken into account. Correspondingly, the equivalent ex-
cess noise is written as[24]:
ε′=1+
T1χ1 + T2χ2 − T2
T1
+
2χ3
T1
, (31)
where χ3 =
1−η
η +
vel
η , and the optimized displacement
operation amplification coefficient is g =
√
2
ηT2
√
VB
VB+2
.
Figure 9 gives the impact of the finite-size effect on the
CV-MDI QKD protocol considering the practical detec-
tion. Compared with the results of Fig. 5, we found that
imperfect detectors have a significant effect on the secret
key rate and the security transmission distance. For in-
stance, when the block length is 1010, the security trans-
mission distance is the farthest, only 17km. Conceivably,
the results will be even more pessimistic in terms of prac-
tical reconciliation efficiency.
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